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ABSTRACT 
 
Citizens minimize information costs by obtaining political information and guidance 
from other individuals who have assumed the costs of acquiring and processing political 
information.  A problem occurs because ideal informants, characterized by the joint 
presence of political expertise and shared viewpoints, are often unavailable or rare within 
the groups where individuals are located.  Hence, individuals must often look beyond 
their own group boundaries to find such individuals, but obtaining information from 
individuals located beyond their own groups produces additional information costs.  
Moreover, the availability of ideal informants varies across groups and settings, with the 
potential to produce (1) biases in favor of some groups at the expense of others, (2) 
varying levels of polarization among groups, and (3) context dependent patterns of 
informant centrality.  The paper’s analysis is based on a series of small group 
experiments, each of which involves two groups of seven subjects who communicate 
with one another via networked computers in order to obtain information on candidates.   
The aggregate implications of the experimental results are analyzed using an agent-based 
model. 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepared for delivery at the Harvard Political Networks Conference, June 11-13, 2009. 
 
 
 A primary cost of political participation lies in the burdens associated with acquiring and 
processing political information. One way to minimize these costs is to obtain political guidance 
on the cheap, from other individuals who have assumed the costs of acquiring and processing the 
information. Hence, a central question in the analysis of political communication revolves 
around the criteria for selecting reliable sources of guidance. Downs (1957) argued that people 
looking for political informants should select experts who share their own political biases -- well 
informed individuals who share a common frame of reference.  
 
A problem occurs because these ideal informants, characterized by the joint presence of 
political expertise and shared biases, may be unavailable or rare within some contexts, but 
inefficiently and redundantly abundant in others.  Some individuals must often look beyond their 
own group boundaries to find such individuals, but obtaining information from individuals 
located beyond their own groups produces additional information costs.  Individuals readily at 
hand -- people located in the same families, workplaces, churches, and so on -- often provide the 
most efficient sources of information.  Other individuals are surrounded by high levels of 
expertise among informants who share their own political instincts – they have the luxury of 
ideal information sources who are readily available and close to home.  
 
As a consequence, the centrality of participants within the political communication 
process is likely to vary both as a function of individual characteristics, as well as a function of 
the contexts where these individuals are located.  In a setting where everyone is an expert, 
expertise is less likely to translate into a central role within the communication process.  
Alternatively, an expert who holds preferences that diverge from those of the group may be less 
central to the communication process than an individual who holds preferences that are dominant 
within the group. 
 
Our paper explores the consequences of availability for the formation of political 
communication networks among cost conscious consumers of political information.   
A primary purpose of this paper's analysis is to evaluate the importance of group membership as 
a constraint on the construction of communication networks. If individuals are located within 
groups where either expertise or shared preferences are rare, are they willing to pay the 
additional costs incurred by seeking out politically expert individuals who lie beyond the group?  
That is, are individuals able and willing to pay the additional information costs that allow them 
to escape the limitations of the information supply within their own groups?  What are the 
implications for the centrality of political experts within communication networks?  What are the 
implications for the formation of political communication networks, for the composition of 
information and preferences in the resulting networks, for levels of political polarization, for the 
diffusion of expertise, and for patterns of bias in political communication?   
 
The analysis is based on a series of small group experiments, each of which involves two 
groups of seven subjects who communicate with one another via networked computers.  The 
experiments involve two candidates, each of whom has a fixed position in a one-dimensional 
policy space. The goal of the experimental subjects is to cast a vote for the candidate who most 
closely matches their own predetermined positions on the same dimension, and subjects are 
rewarded with a cash incentive if the candidate closest to them wins the election. Information 
comes to the subjects in three different forms: publicly available information that is free but of 
low quality; privately acquired information that may cost more but is of higher quality; and 
socially communicated information taken from other individuals.  Individuals are able to obtain 
information from as many as two other subjects, but the information obtained from individuals 
within their own group is free, while information obtained from the other group is more costly.  
This analytic framework will provide an opportunity to examine the construction of social 
networks within and beyond the group boundaries. 
 
Experts and Biases 
 
 An enduring problem lies at the heart of this analysis – the alternative and often 
competing criteria that individuals might employ in selecting political informants.  In his 
Economic Theory of Democracy, Anthony Downs (1957) argues that socially communicated 
information provides a labor saving device that citizens might productively use to minimize 
information costs.  Rather than collecting, processing, and evaluating political information 
themselves, individuals might employ free information taken from other individuals -- 
individuals who enjoy politics and receive a personal benefit from the process of becoming 
informed (Fiorina 1990).  He argues that rational, goal oriented information seekers should select 
politically expert individuals who share their own political biases.   
 
 This paper considers several problems related to the Downsian recommendation.  First, 
the relative salience of political expertise and shared biases between the informant and the 
recipient of information takes on importance because it may be difficult to locate expert 
informants who hold congenial viewpoints.  A number of observational efforts have shown that 
the presence or absence of shared political preferences among and between citizens is a less than 
perfect predictor of the presence and frequency of political communication among citizens 
(Huckfeldt, Ikeda, and Pappi 2005; Huckfeldt and Mendez 2008).  While individuals typically 
hold the preferences that are dominant within the groups where they are located, many of them 
are quite willing to talk about politics with individuals who do not share their own political 
preferences (but see Mutz 2006).  Moreover, observational studies point toward political 
expertise – and the higher levels of political engagement that accompany it – as factors that 
stimulate political communication and discussion (Huckfeldt 2001). 
 
 These observational studies coincide, at least partially, with the formal argument of 
Calvert (1985) that rational individuals might profitably learn from the advice offered by 
informants holding heterogeneous political perspectives, given that they are able to identify the 
informants' biases.  This individual level argument provides a striking parallel to the network 
argument of Granovetter (1973), that individuals are more likely to obtain new and innovative 
information when their patterns of interaction reach beyond the closely held confines of cohesive 
microenvironments where they spend most of their social interaction energies. 
 
 If there are benefits to heterogeneous communication networks, why does Downs argue 
one should exclusively speak with those who share the individual’s biases?  A game theoretical 
perspective would note that communication in these situations is largely cheap talk – informants 
can send any signal they desire without having to pay a cost to send the signal (Crawford and 
Sobel 1982).  Consequently, the informants are free to dissemble in ways that will offer them an 
advantage unless an external factor compels them to provide information consistent with their 
beliefs.  Lupia and McCubbins (1998) argue informants will provide accurate information if 
there are sanctions for lying, if the information provided might be verified, or if the both 
members of the discussion dyad share the same biases because the incentive to dissemble is 
removed. 
 
 While these theorists are concerned with informants intentionally sending biased 
messages, Downs argues informants must necessarily provide biased information because they 
must withhold some information.  If the individual and the informant share the same biases, then 
the informant will provide information biased in the same manner that the individual would have 
biased the information.  Hence, even if the informant’s messages are not intentionally 
misleading, there is reason to question information from people on the other side of the issues. 
 
The Costs of Social Communication 
 
 A second problem relates to the extent that socially communicated information is, in fact, 
free.  For many citizens, the path of least resistance is simply to accept whomever is available as 
a political discussion partner.  After all, the Downsian logic regarding political discussion and its 
utility is that it is available on the cheap, bypassing the problem that almost any information cost 
is likely to swamp the very small expected benefits from political participation once they are 
down-weighted by the infinitesimally small probability that an individual vote will be decisive in 
affecting a political outcome.  This begs the question as to how far individuals are willing to go 
in accepting significant costs in their search for political informants.  That is, if individuals are 
seeking out informants as a labor saving device, are there practical limits on their willingness to 
expend resources in the search for the perfect informant? 
 
 This is a problem with far reaching implications.  Consider, for example, a committed 
evangelical Christian with moderate to liberal political instincts.  Even though politically 
progressive evangelicals constitute a not insignificant political force, their numbers within the 
larger evangelical community tend to be relatively small.  Hence, when our liberal evangelical 
looks for a worship community, finding a church that shares her political instincts might be quite 
difficult.  What costs is she willing to pay to be located among other evangelicals who are both 
politically progressive and politically expert?  How far would she be willing to drive on Sunday 
mornings?  Is she willing to screen her political discussions at a politically conservative place of 
worship? 
 
 As an empirical matter, both political preferences and political expertise are likely to vary 
across groups.  Hence, an individual might find himself in a group that is full of political experts 
but lacking in individuals with her own political preferences.  Alternatively an individual might 
find himself surrounded by fellow travelers but lacking even a shred of useful political 
knowledge.   
 
In this general context, some individuals would seem to be particularly fortunate – 
surrounded by politically expert individuals with compatible political preferences.  At a more 
general strategic level, however, this scenario contains its own problems.  When an expert is 
surrounded by other experts with shared preferences, her influence is likely to be severely 
circumscribed due to her redundant contribution to the political mix of the group.  For example, 
liberal college professors and conservative bank officers often prove to be a dime a dozen – 
essentially interchangeable within the environments where (1) their particular preferences 
dominate and (2) the collective levels of expertise are often quite high. 
 
 In summary, we are concerned with the contextual constraints that surround the choice of 
political informants and hence their centrality within political communication networks.  How 
important is political expertise relative to shared preferences as a criterion for the selection of 
informants?  Are either or both sufficiently important that individuals, in an effort to satisfy the 
criteria, would be willing to pay for information that would otherwise be free? What are the 
consequences that arise due to the distribution of expertise and preferences within and among 
naturally occurring groups?  In particular, how do these distributions affect the search for 
information, as well as the influence of potential informants? 
 
The Framework of the Experimental Design 
 
Our experimental framework is designed to combine the advantages of small group 
dynamics with network representations of communication in the context of an experimental 
design.  The experiments involve two groups of seven subjects who communicate with one 
another via networked computers.  The experimental setting is based on a mock election with 
two “candidates” who are not real human subjects, but are represented as positions on a one-
dimensional policy space.  The policy space varies from 1 to 7, and each of the seven subjects 
has a unique integer position that remains constant across the rounds in an experimental session. 
The candidate positions are reset at each round, but Candidate A’s position always lies in the 
interval between 1 and 6 inclusive, while Candidate B’s position always lies in the interval 
between 2 and 7 inclusive.   The goal of an experimental subject is to elect the “candidate” who 
most closely matches their own predetermined position on the same dimension, and subjects are 
rewarded with a cash incentive if the candidate closest to them wins the election at that round.  
  
The exact positions of the candidates are not known to the voters, thereby creating an 
incentive to obtain information.  The information comes to the subjects in three different forms: 
publicly available information that is free but of low quality; privately acquired information of 
higher quality with a variable cost that is randomly assigned to individual subjects; and socially 
communicated information taken from other individuals that has a variable cost.  The public 
information is that one candidate's position lies somewhere between 1 and 6, and the other 
candidate's position lies somewhere between 2 and 7.  Individual information costs are assigned 
to subjects at the beginning of the experimental session, and they are charged 0, 5, or 25 ECUs 
(Experimental Currency Units).  Socially communicated information is free if it is obtained from 
an individual in the subject's own group, but it costs 10 ECUs if taken from an individual in the 
other experimental group..  
 
At the beginning of each round of voting, subjects are endowed with 100 ECUs.   
Subjects are allowed to use up to 50 ECUs to purchase on the candidates’ positions.  After 
voting, if the winning candidate’s position is closer to a voter than the losing candidate’s 
position, the voter earns 50 extra ECUs. If the winning candidate’s position is farther away from 
the voter’s position than the losing candidate's position, 50 ECUs are subtracted from the voter’s 
account. If the two candidates are equally distanced from the voter, then the voter neither gains 
nor loses ECUs.  A voter could thus earn 150 ECUs maximum in a round, but only if they did 
not purchase the information on the candidates’ true positions. On the other hand, the minimum 
possible payoff for a subject in a period is 0 ECUs; this happens when a voter spends 50 ECUs 
on purchasing information and her favorite candidate loses the election.   At the end of the 
experiment, the subjects are paid in cash the show-up fee plus their total earnings during the 
experiment. (One hundred  ECUs equal a U.S. dollar.) 
 
The Distribution of Information Costs and Preferences 
 
In addition to manipulating individually held preferences and information costs, the 
distributions of preferences and information costs within groups were experimentally 
manipulated across experimental sessions.  This creates four different distributional contexts, 
with three experimental sessions assigned to each context.   
 
 In the first context, both information costs and ideal points were distributed 
asymmetrically.  The first group had right leaning preferences and high information costs. The 
second group had left leaning preferences and low information costs.   
 
 In the second context, information costs were distributed identically within groups, but 
ideal points were distributed asymmetrically.  The first group had right leaning preferences, and 
the second had left leaning preferences.   
 
 In the third context, ideal points were distributed identically within the groups, but 
information costs were distributed asymmetrically.  The first group had high information costs, 
and the second had low information costs.   
 
 Finally, in the baseline session, both information costs and ideal points were distributed 
the same in both groups.    
 
In sessions where information costs were identical between the groups, two subjects paid 
nothing for information, two subjects paid 5 ECUs, and three subjects paid 25 ECUs.  When 
information costs were distributed asymmetrically, one subject paid 5 ECUs in the first, high cost 
group, and 6 subjects paid 25 ECUs. In the second, low cost group, 4 subjects paid nothing for 
information, and 3 subjects paid 5 ECUs for each piece of information. In sessions where ideal 
points were distributed identically within the groups, one subject in each group held each of the 
positions from 1 through 7.  In contrast, when ideal points were distributed asymmetrically: two 
subjects in the first  right-leaning group  were at position 7, 2 at position 6, 2 at position 5, and 1 
at position 4.  In the second, left-leaning group:  2 subjects were at position 1, 2 at position 2, 2 
at position 3, and 1 at position 4.  
 
The Experimental Procedure 
 
The following steps occur during the experiment. At the beginning of the experiment, 
subjects are assigned their respective integer preferences on a one-dimensional policy space from 
1 to 7. Two subjects are assigned to each of the seven policy points. Information costs are 
randomly assigned to subjects such that four subjects receive up to four pieces of information on 
each candidate for free, four may purchase up to four pieces of information at a rate of 5 ECUs 
for each piece of information, and six may purchase up to two pieces of information at a rate of 
25 ECUs for each piece of information.  Once assigned, these positions and the information costs 
remain unchanged for each subject for the duration of the experiment. The subjects are 
accurately informed that Candidate A's position lies between 1 and 6, while Candidate B's 
position is set between 2 and 7. Then, in each of the approximately 15 rounds per session, the 
following steps occur: 
 
 1. The two candidates’ positions are drawn from the respective intervals. 
 
 2. The subjects are given an opportunity to purchase information at the assigned cost.  A 
single "piece" of information arrives in the form (a, b) where a and b are integer estimates of the 
candidate positions. With α and β as true positions, the signals a and b are randomly and 
independently drawn from uniform intervals [α - 3, α +3] and [β-3, β +3]. Subjects were told 
both how signals were drawn, thus reflecting on average the true candidate positions. Note that a 
signal of “-2” thus provided definitive information regarding a candidate’s position. 
 
 3. After the subjects have received the information, they are asked to provide a prior 
judgment regarding  where they believe each candidate’s position to be.  This information is not 
communicated to other subjects. 
 
 4. After being shown all the subjects’ positions on the policy scale, the groups to which 
they belong, and the amount of information each has purchased, they are allowed to request 
information from two other subjects. If the potential informant belongs to their own group, the 
information is free, but if the potential informant belongs to the opposite group, the subject must 
pay 10 ECUs.  The potential informants need not comply with the request, and they need not 
provide accurate information.  If a subject agrees to provide information, the information 
provider sends a message in the form of (a, b) where a is the provider’s message regarding the 
position of candidate A, and b is the provider’s message regarding the position of candidate B.  
Communication costs, preferences, and group membership are randomly assigned  to subjects at 
the beginning of the session, and they are  is held constant across the rounds of the experiment.    
 
 5. After receiving information from one another, the subjects are provided a summary of 
the information they have received, and they vote for one of the candidates.   
 
 6.  The outcome of the election is revealed to the voters. If the winning candidate’s 
position is closer to a voter than the losing candidate’s, 50 ECUs are added to the voter's account. 
If the losing candidate’s position is closer to a voter than the winning candidate’s, 50 ECUs are 
taken from the voter’s account. The subjects are informed of their net earnings, which are 
accumulated across rounds. 
 
 7. The candidate positions are reset, and subjects proceed to the next round.   
 
Thus, although the true positions of the two candidates are unknown, the voters have 
three potential sources of information on which to base their votes. First, the fact that the two 
candidates’ positions are drawn from different intervals could potentially help a voter in the 
absence of other forms of information, and this information should be particularly helpful to 
voters with more extreme positions.  Second, voters are allowed to spend up to 50 ECU’s to 
obtain unbiased but noisy information on the candidates’ true positions.  Third and finally, each 
subject has an opportunity to request information from two other subjects.  Before they make 
these requests, all subjects are shown the policy positions of each subject, as well as the number 
of pieces of information each subject purchased. 
 
Each bit of privately purchased information is drawn from uniform distributions with 
midpoints centered at the candidates’ true positions and boundaries that are symmetrical to the 
midpoints.  This means that individuals must make judgments regarding candidates based on 
unbiased but noisy information.  In contrast, when individuals rely on the judgments of other 
subjects, they are not only depending on the volume of information that serves as the basis for 
these subjects’ judgments, but also on the ability and willingness of the source to compile and 
communicate this information in an unbiased manner.   To the extent that individuals inject bias 
into the information they communicate, the quality of the information is potentially degraded. 
 
Proximate Effects of the Experimental Manipulations 
 
 The experimental manipulations involve the random assignment of ideal points, 
information costs, and group memberships to subjects.  At the individual level, subjects are 
assigned a preference on the 1 through 7 scale, and they are assigned an information cost of 
either 0, 5, or 25 ECUs for each piece of information they purchase.  At the aggregate level, they 
are assigned to groups that vary in the distribution of both ideal points and information costs, and 
they are given the opportunity to request information from individuals in their own group for 
free, as well as in the other group at a cost of 10 ECUs.  The first questions that arise are related 
to the proximate consequences of these information costs for the acquisition of information.   
 
 Part A of Table 1 shows that individually levied information costs have a pronounced 
effect on the individual subjects’ information purchases.  Among those subjects for whom 
information is free, more than 60 percent request the maximum, and nearly 80 percent request 
three or four pieces of information.  In contrast, subjects who must pay 5 ECUs for each piece of 
information are less likely to purchase information.  Less than one-fourth request four pieces of 
information, and only about 40 percent request more than two pieces of information.  Among 
those who must pay 25 ECUs, nearly 60 percent  purchase 0 or 1 piece of information, with 
thirty-four percent purchasing two pieces -- the maximum allowed .    In short, information costs 
translate directly into information purchases. 
 
 Part B of Table 1 addresses a second proximate consequence of information costs.  Each 
individual can make two requests for information from other individuals, and this part of the 
table shows the number of information requests received by individuals.  This includes requests 
received from other members of the same group, requests received from members of the opposite 
group, as well as the total number of requests.  The summary statistics show that, over all the 
sessions, subjects received an average of 1.94 requests per round, with 1.68 requests coming 
from members of the same group and .26 requests coming from a member of the opposite group.     
In short, it would appear that the costs incurred communicating outside one’s  group are fairly 
prohibitive.  While nearly 26 percent of the subjects failed to receive a request from their own 
group in any particular round, nearly 80 percent failed to receive a request from the opposite 
group in any particular round.  Hence, the cost of out-group communication produces a 
formidable barrier to the flow of information. 
 
 These proximate effects are not surprising in and of themselves.  They merely show that 
the various incentives and disincentives perform as expected.  Subjects are sensitive to 
information costs in making purchases, and the disincentives to cross-group communication 
encourage individuals to keep communication within their own groups.  The larger questions 
concern the consequences of the proximate effects for the communication process. 
 
 One of the central questions regarding these proximate effects is whether they produce 
any variation in actual levels of expertise among the subjects.  That is, are the subjects who 
purchase more information better able to make informed choices?  We address this question in 
Part C of Table 1, where the subject’s initial (or prior) judgment regarding the position of each 
candidate prior to communication  is regressed on the candidate’s true position, the number of 
pieces of information purchased by the subject, and the multiplicative interaction between the 
two.  In the model, the data arranged so that both of a subject’s estimates in a single round are 
separate cases. 
 
 The table shows a relationship between the prior judgment and the candidate’s true 
position that is substantially enhanced by the number of pieces of information purchased by the 
subject.  A subject’s judgment regarding a candidate’s position demonstrates a modest 
relationship among subjects who did not purchase any information (.34), but a substantial effect 
among those subjects who purchased four pieces of information (.87).  In short, information 
costs produces a direct effect on information purchases, and information purchases produce an 
effect on the expertise with which subjects render judgments regarding candidates. 
 
 All these are only proximate effects, however.  We would not expect individuals to 
purchase and communicate information based solely on information and communication costs.  
In the spirit of Downs (1957), Festinger (1957), Berelson et al. (1954), Katz and Lazarsfeld 
(1955), Katz (1957) and others, our expectation is that individuals will also take into account the 
political preferences of potential informants, the expertise of potential informants, and the range 
of informant alternatives that are available to them. 
 
Complex Choices Subject to Alternative Contexts 
 
 Each of the subjects is able to request free information from the other six members of his 
or her own group, as well as to purchase information from the seven members of the opposite 
group for a cost of 10 ECUs.  The price is charged against the purchaser’s account, but it is not 
transferred to the subject who provides the information.  Hence, there is a price for purchasing 
the information, but no profit to the subject providing it.   
 
 The first issue to be addressed is the set of characteristics and locations of the individuals 
who receive the requests.  We address this issue in the context of network centrality (Freeman 
1979), to locate the individuals who receive the most requests for information.  In the language 
of social networks, this is a measure of "degree centrality," and as we saw in Table 1B, the 
number of requests for information varies quite dramatically over the subjects.  The number of 
requests  per round varies from 0 to nine, with nearly a quarter of the subjects not receiving any 
information requests during a typical round, and nearly 20 percent receiving four requests or 
more.  Which individuals are being asked to provide information? 
 
 The problem of centrality can be understood visually, on the basis of Figure 1, which 
graphically displays the maps of the communication networks in each of the twelve sessions 
spread across the four different contextual distributions of expertise levels and preferences.  
These network maps demonstrate higher levels of communication within rather than between 
groups, as well as more ties and more frequent contacts with subjects who purchase more 
information.  In the analyses that follow, we address a range of factors related to these outcomes, 
as well as the consequence of these outcomes for the aggregate distribution of information. 
 
 Part A of Table 2 regresses the number of out-group and in-group requests for 
information on several explanatory variables – the amount of information purchased by the 
subject, the difference between the amount of information purchased by the subject and the mean 
amount purchased by the relevant group, the mean information cost in the group, the interaction 
between information purchased and mean information cost in the group, and the absolute 
distance from the individual subject's preference to the mean preference in the group.   
 
 Several factors stand out as particularly important.  First, centrality within a subject's own 
group (the "in-group") is only enhanced by the individual's information purchases relative to the 
mean level of purchases in the group.  This suggests that an abundance of experts creates a 
situation in which no particular informant is likely to become particularly central to the 
communication process.   
 
 Second, the number of requests received from the opposite group (the "out-group") is 
similarly driven by the difference between information purchased by the individual subject and 
the mean information level in the out-group.  Once again, the centrality of the expert is defined 
relative to the information distribution within the group in question.   
 
 Third, out-group centrality is diminished by the mean information cost in the out-group.  
That is, subjects who have high information costs are less willing and able to invest in 
information taken from beyond the group.  This would appear to place a group with high 
information costs somewhere between a rock and a hard place.  Not only are the members of 
such a group unable to obtain information on their own, but they are also unable to pay the cost 
of reaching beyond their own group to acquire information from  expert informants.1  This is a 
severe limitation because, by definition, there are very few individuals in their own group who 
are expert. 
 
 Finally, there is little evidence here to support the importance of shared preferences.  
Subjects who lie closest to the group's mean preference are on average in a higher level of 
agreement with other group members.  Perhaps surprisingly, the absolute difference between the 
                                                            
1 Indeed, a high cost individual who purchases two pieces of private information is unable to purchase 
information from an out-group informant because she is limited to a total information cost of 50 ECUs. 
subject's preference and the mean preference within the group in question generates coefficients 
that lie in the expected direction, but with meager t-values.   
 
 Part B of Table 2 reformulates the same problem in terms of mean information costs in 
groups, individual information costs, the amount of information purchased, and the absolute 
distance separating a potential informant's preference from the relevant group preference.  The 
dummy variables in these models capture the various treatments that are due to the individual 
and group-level manipulation of costs, with controls for individual information purchased and 
the preference distance between the individual and the group. 
 
 In terms of in-group requests, the largest effect on centrality occurs among the moderate 
cost individuals in high cost groups.  Recall that the high cost groups included 6 individuals who 
had high information costs of 25 ECUs, and only 1 moderate cost individual with information 
costs of 5 ECUs.  Hence they become the key sources of information in these groups of subjects 
who are unlikely to pay the costs of moving beyond the group.  These same subjects show large 
effects for out-group centrality as well -- in this instance because the out-group has low 
information costs and the moderate cost individual is apt to be the most expert subject in the in-
group. 
 
 Finally, it is useful to compare the low cost individuals located in medium cost groups to 
the low cost individuals in low cost groups.  These individuals are more likely to demonstrate 
high levels of in-group centrality in the moderate cost groups.  Indeed, their in-group centrality 
score actually declines from the overall baseline in the low cost groups.  In short, we see 
abundant evidence that context matters to the construction of these communication networks. 
 
What Are the Criteria that Individuals Use in Selecting Informants? 
  
 In this analysis we switch the focus from the individual being selected as an informant to 
the individual who is making the selection.  Under what circumstances are individuals willing to 
pay the price of locating informants beyond their own group – beyond their immediate circle of 
readily available associates.  In this section, we look at the subjects’ communication choices – 
whether or not they request information from particular individuals.  Hence the analysis expands 
to include each dyad at every period of all the sessions, thereby increasing the number of 
observations to 22,932 potential dyads.2  
 
 Table 3 displays a logit model where the dependent variable measures whether one 
subject requests information from another subject, and where the characteristics of both the 
potential informant and the potential requestor are specified.  Thus, we include a dyadic 
proximity measure which calculates the absolute difference between the ideal points of the 
potential informants and requestors.  Several dummy variables are also included in the 
regression.  The first measures whether the potential informants and requestors belong to the 
same group.  A second measures whether the subject pays a medium information cost (5 ECUs), 
                                                            
2 In order to avoid an underestimation of the standard errors on the model coefficients, we employ a 
clustering procedure where the clusters are the 168 subjects who participated in the experiment (Rogers 
1993). 
 
and the third measures whether the subject pays a high information cost (25 ECUs). Once again, 
the reader should note that the high cost individuals cannot, due to the construction of the 
experiment, purchase social information from the out-group if they buy two pieces of private 
information.  A third measures the interaction between the first two – the joint incidence of the 
potential informant and the subject belonging to the same group and the subject paying a high 
information cost   
 
Table 3 shows several discernible effects.  As before, the information purchased by the 
potential informant produces an effect in which the subject is more likely to request information.  
The absolute distance between the ideal points of the potential informant and the requestor also 
produces an effect, where a request is less likely to be made as the distance increases.  Finally, 
the dummy variables show that subjects are more likely to select informants who are members of 
their own groups – a result that is in keeping with the higher cost of communication between 
groups.  And this effect is substantially enhanced among subjects who pay the highest 
information cost of 25 ECUs, but not among the subjects who pay 5 ECUs. 
 
 The magnitudes of effects are addressed in Table 3B, where the predicted probability of a 
communication request is shown as the consequence of the factors included in Table 3A.  As 
before, the levels of information purchased by the potential informants are particularly important, 
producing dramatic increases in the probability of selection.  The distance between the ideal 
points of subjects and informants is also important, but its effect is less pronounced.  For 
example, if we consider the second and fourth rows of the table, we see that the potential 
informant’s information purchases increase the probability from .10 to .57 and from .04 to .33 – 
approximately six and ten-fold increases.  In contrast, reducing the distances between ideal 
points increases the probability from .04 to .10 and from .33 to .57 – approximately twofold 
increases.   
 
The table also shows a pronounced negative effect on the probability due to 
communication across group boundaries – an effect that is enhanced for subjects with high 
information costs.  The enhancement of the negative effect among high information cost subjects 
is best seen as the result of competition for scarce resources.  The high cost subjects – subjects 
who must pay 25 ECUs for each piece of individually obtained information – exhaust their 
information budget after purchasing two pieces of information.  Hence, they are unable to 
allocate additional ECUs to the purchase of communicated information from an informant who 
does not belong to their group.  And we see evidence of these limitations in the unwillingness of 
high cost subjects to select informants from the opposite group.   
 
While subjects prefer to select informants closer to them on the policy scale, under 
certain circumstances they are willing to accept messages from informants with divergent 
preferences.  The model in Table 4A addresses to what extent the distance between dyad 
members affects the messages informants send.  In the model, the message an informant sends 
about a candidate is regressed on the informant’s initial estimate, the distance between the 
subjects, and the interaction of those two variables.  This interaction tests whether the likelihood 
that an informant’s messages reflect her true beliefs is conditional on the distance between the 
subjects. 
 
As the model shows, when both dyad members have the same preference, subjects send 
messages that are representative of their true beliefs about the candidate positions.  Subjects who 
receive messages from informants on the other side of the policy scale, however, risk receiving 
inaccurate messages.  This is most clearly seen in the predicted messages in Table 4B.  When 
dyad members are on opposite sides of the policy scale, informants send messages that do not 
perfectly reflect their initial estimates.  The informants are somewhat constrained and do not 
wholly misrepresent candidate positions.  If an informant believes a candidate’s true position is 
1, the informant is not going to send a message that the candidate’s position is 7.  An informant 
would not send that message because, if the receiver has any information, she will realize the 
message is not credible and choose to ignore the message. 
 
In summary, these results establish the relative importance of various criteria that the 
individual subjects impose on their choice of an informant and how those choices affect the 
messages they receive.  Informant expertise is particularly important, followed by (1) the 
proximity of the subject’s preference to the preference of the potential informant and (2) and 
membership in the same group.  As the informant moves away from the subject on the policy 
scale, the messages the informant sends are more likely to diverge from the informants true 
beliefs.  The final step in the analysis is to consider the aggregate consequences of these 
individually imposed decisions.   
 
Aggregate Consequences of Individual Level Effects  
 
In these final analyses, we consider the aggregate consequences that arise as a 
consequence of the individual selection criteria that subjects impose on the construction of 
communication networks.  The process we are describing is usefully and inevitably seen at 
multiple levels of meaning and measurement.  Individuals make informant choices, which create 
patterns of interdependence among actors, which translate into a different fabric and pattern of 
relationships among and between groups within the larger aggregate population.   
 
Interdependence holds the key to understanding the relationships between individuals and 
aggregates in this analysis.  The aggregate is more than a simple summation of the individuals 
who are making decisions, and the individuals cannot be understood apart from the particular 
contexts in which they are located.  To focus solely on groups and aggregates runs the risk of 
ecological fallacies, but to focus solely on individuals runs the risk of individualistic fallacies.   
 
We are particularly interested in the relative distributions of preferences and information 
within groups for the level of communication between groups.  Table 3 shows that individuals 
are more likely to communicate with experts who share their preferences, and they are less likely 
to pay the additional costs of communicating with individuals who lie beyond the boundaries of 
their own groups.  The ideal informant is thus the fellow group member who is politically expert 
and shares their own preferences.  But what if such an informant is unavailable – what if the 
individual must look beyond his own setting for an expert with shared preferences?   What are 
the implications for the numbers and directions of ties between groups?  What are the 
implications for the expertise of the aggregate?  How do communication patterns influence the 
quality of information received by groups of varying preferences and expertise?  And what are 
the implications for the dominance of particular groups as information sources? 
 
An Agent-Based Model of Network Formation 
 
 We address these questions by constructing an agent-based model of network formation 
that extends the Table 3 results.  Rather than two groups with seven subjects in each group, the 
model includes nine agents in four groups.  Individuals are arranged in 4 quadrants on a 6 x 6 
grid, such that each quadrant consists of a distinct group of nine individuals.   
 
 The baseline. In the baseline formulation, which corresponds to the fourth context in the 
experiment, each agent is assigned both a unique policy preference on a scale of 0 to 8, and 
between 0 and 4 pieces of information.  The distribution of information is assigned randomly 
within the groups, where the probabilities of 0 through 4 pieces of information within each group 
approximates the marginal distribution of information shown among the subjects in Table: {0, 1, 
1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 4, 4}.  Thus the distribution of information and preferences is symmetric across the 
four groups, and the relationship between preferences and information levels is random within 
the groups. 
 
 Asymmetric preferences.  In two alternative contexts, preferences are assigned 
asymmetrically, such that each group has a narrow range of preferences, and multiple agents 
share the same preference.  The distributions across the four groups are: {0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2}, 
{2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4}, {4, 4, 5, 5, 5, 5, 6, 6, 6}, {6, 7, 7, 7, 7, 8, 8, 8, 8}.  Thus, while the 
overall distribution of preferences corresponds to the baseline, it is highly skewed and 
asymmetric across the groups. 
 
 Asymmetric information.  Similarly, information is also assigned asymmetrically in two 
contexts, such that each group has a narrow range of information levels, and multiple agents 
share the same information levels.  In these asymmetrical information distributions, agents are 
randomly assigned information to produce the following distributions across the groups: {0, 0, 0, 
0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}, {1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2}, {2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3}, {3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4}.  As 
before, information is randomly assigned within groups so that information is independent from 
preferences within the groups.  Hence, while the overall distribution of information in these two 
contexts corresponds to the baseline, it is highly skewed and asymmetric across the groups. 
 
 In summary, four contextual distributions are established:  (1) asymmetrical preferences 
and asymmetrical information across the four groups, (2) asymmetrical preferences and 
symmetrical information across the four groups, (3) symmetrical preferences and asymmetrical 
information across the four groups, and (4) the baseline with symmetric preferences and 
symmetric information across the four groups.  (See Appendix Table A1.) 
 
 All agents select two other agents from whom to obtain information, based on the logit 
model of Table 3.  Each of the other 35 agents is thus assigned a probability of being selected 
that is proportional to the probability set by the logit model, and hence preference is given to 
agents within the same group, agents with similar preference assignments, and agents that 
possess more information. In the first formulation, the agents are not restricted in their ability to 
purchase information through social communication regardless of their own information level, 
thereby omitting the high cost factors from the model.  This is equivalent to assuming that all the 
agents have low and moderate information costs.  The model is run for 100 iterations, for each 
contextual distribution, with each agent making two selections at each iteration, and hence the 
agents for a particular nine-agent group make a total of 1800 information selections. 
 
Patterns of Communication among the Agents 
 
 Table 5 provides the proportion of requests that are directed from the agents within each 
group arrayed along the rows, to agents within all the other groups, arrayed along the columns.  
The table shows that the agents are most likely to select information sources within their own 
groups.  This can be seen quite clearly by examining the main diagonals within each part of the 
table.    
 
 As would be expected, there is virtually no variation in the diagonal entries in the 
baseline distribution of Part D.  That is, the in-group selection probabilities vary from .826 to 
.850, and all the other selection probabilities vary within very tight bounds of .047 to .067.   In 
short, when the expertise and preference distributions are symmetric within the groups, all the 
agents face the same selection task using the same selection criteria. 
 
 In Part B of the table, when information is distributed symmetrically but preferences are 
distributed asymmetrically, the values in the main diagonal are even larger, varying from .886 to 
.910.  In this instance, there is even less likelihood that an agent would reach beyond the group 
for an informant.  That is, every group has the same information distribution, and preferences are 
highly clustered within the group.  In such an instance, it is particularly straightforward task for 
an agent to implement the Downsian strategy of selecting an informant that is both well informed 
and holds a compatible political preference.  Part B does, however, show slight but systematic 
variation in the out-group selection probabilities across out-groups.  As the out-group grows 
more distant from the in-group, the corresponding selection probabilities grow smaller, 
corresponding to the corresponding increase distance in terms of preference distributions. 
 
 In contrast, Parts A and C display significant variation in the size of the in-group 
selection probabilities.  In Part A, where both preferences and information levels are distributed 
asymmetrically, the in-group selection probability increases from .815 to .976 as the level of 
information within the group increases.  The agents in group 1 confront a particularly 
challenging task – they are located in a low information group with distinctive political 
preferences.  If they choose informants to maximize expertise by selecting from group 4, they 
pay the price of selecting an informant with highly divergent preferences.  Alternatively, if they 
make informant selections that maximize shared preferences by choosing an in-group agent from 
group 1, they are forced to select agents who are the least expert. 
 
 The agents in Part C confront a choice that is in some ways easier – while information is 
distributed asymmetrically, preferences are distributed symmetrically.  Thus, all the agents in 
every group are able to find an expert informant  in group 4 with  preferences that approximate 
their own.  Not surprisingly, the in-group selection probability for group 4 is particularly high, 
.954.  The agents in group 1 – the group with the lowest information level – demonstrate the 
lowest in-group selection probability in the table, .621.  And they show a correspondingly high 
probability (.248) of selecting an informant from the politically expert group 4. 
 
 It is important to emphasize that the individual level selection probabilities for the agents 
are all estimated on the basis of the same individual level model taken from Table 3.  The 
differences we see in Table 5 are not predicated on the basis of individual level differences in the 
agents, but rather based on differences in the contextually determined choice set that is presented 
as a consequence of contextual variation in the distribution of information and preferences across 
groups.  This does not mean, however, that the differences we observe in Table 5 are 
inconsequential. 
 
Dynamical Implications of Contextual Variation 
 
 As we have seen, contextual variation in preference distributions and expertise 
distributions produce variations in information flows across groups.   Moreover, these variations 
produce advantages and disadvantages for particular groups.  In particular, groups with members 
who have access to more information tend to dominate the communication process, and this 
domination produces cumulative consequences for the aggregate distribution of information in 
the larger community. 
 
 Each of the four sets of group based selection proportions can be treated as a transition 
matrix in a Markov process.3 We define the transition (communication) matrix as C, where  
 
cij= the probability that someone from group i will take their next piece of information from 
group j 
 
At  some initial time point before a particular subject is a topic for communication, information 
is held individually but not communicated , and we treat this information as coming from the 
group to which the individual belongs.  As an initial condition, information sources are thus 
distributed proportionally across the four groups {.25, .25, .25, .25}.  Hence we correspondingly 
define: 
 
gjt= a row vector with four columns where the entries are the cumulative proportions of 
information in the population taken from  groups 1 through 4 at time t.   
 
The distribution of information sources after one round of communication (g1) is thus equal to 
g0C; after two rounds g0C2; and after n rounds g0Cn. 
 
 The dominance of a politically expert group is based on the group members' increased 
access to information, but dominance is only realized through the communication process – and  
not simply realized but actually enhanced.  While communication increases the volume of 
information available throughout a population, all information originates from a particular 
source, and we can think of the information as being distinctive to its source.   
 
                                                            
3 In order to treat this as a Markov process, we must assume that the selection probabilities are constant in 
time.  In fact, the relative constancy of the experimentally generated selection probabilities across rounds 
in the experiment supports this assumption. 
 The process thus described produces an equilibrium distribution of information, g*, 
identified according to its source.  This equilibrium distribution is wholly a function of the 
transition probabilities, completely independent of the initial distribution of information.  That is, 
the only behavioral information needed to identify the equilibrium for information sources is the 
matrix of transition probabilities.  And the equilibria shown in the bottom row of each part to 
Table 4 are calculated by raising the transition matrix to successively higher powers until its 
rows converge to produce the equilibrium vector. 
 
 When information is distributed symmetrically across groups, the behavioral response of 
the subjects (and hence the agents) produces an egalitarian equilibrium vector for the population 
that is balanced across the groups. In contrast, when information is asymmetrically distributed 
across groups, the behavioral response of the subjects (and hence the agents) produces an 
equilibrium vector for the population that dramatically magnifies the initial informational 
inequalities.   
 
 What are the implications of including the high cost subjects in the analysis?  Table 6 
replicates Table 5 but includes high cost agents in the analysis.  We do this by assigning agents 
holding 0, 1, and 2 pieces of information to the high cost category, proportionate to the 
distribution in the experimental results.  These agents then select informants according to the full 
logic of Table 5, including the decreased likelihood of selecting a member of an out-group.  
 
 Table 6 shows that adding the high cost agents drives up the magnitude of the main 
diagonal, particular for entries that represent a high cost group.  (See in particular groups 1 and 2 
in Parts A and C of Tables 5 and 6.) Once again, the high cost groups that need additional 
information the most are least able to take advantage of expertise located in groups other than 
their own.   
 
 At the same time, the Table 6 equilibrium vectors in Part A and C are little changed from 
Table 5.  The highest cost groups in the asymmetric information distributions account for little or 
none of the aggregate information, and the informational dominance of the lowest cost group is 
only modestly reduced. 
 
  In short, the low cost information groups play the dominant role in creating the aggregate 
distribution of information.  And these tendencies toward exaggerated informational inequities 
are wholly a function of asymmetric information distributions in combination with the individual 
tendency to rely on informational experts that is documented in the experimental results 
presented earlier. 
 
How Accurate is the Communicated Information? 
 
Information and preference distributions can determine whether some groups dominate as 
informational sources, and they can also create inequalities in the quality of information 
communicated between groups.  We examine the quality of messages sent by informants by 
again using estimates obtained from the experimental setting and extending them through the 
agent-based model.  Using the experimental data, we use the estimates from Table 1C (modeling 
agents’ priors according to the amount of information they’ve purchased, the true candidate 
position, and an interaction) to determine agents’ priors.  Here, we consider two candidate 
configurations: polarized candidates, where candidate A is positioned at 1 and candidate B is 
positioned at 7; and convergent candidates, where candidate A is positioned at 3 and candidate B 
is positioned at 5. 
 
We use the agents’ priors to calculate the message sent by informants to requesters, based 
on the model in Table 4A (modeling message according to the distance between the informant 
and the requester, and an interaction). Using our estimates for priors and messages, we calculate 
the noise received by each agent in the agent-based model according to: 
               ______________ 
noise = √(message - prior)2   
 
Because subjects in the experiment and agents in the model receive information about 
two candidates, we calculate priors and sent messages for each candidate.  Our estimate of the 
noise received by a particular agent requester from a particular agent informant is then the 
average of the noise estimates associated with each candidate. 
 
These noise estimates allow us to investigate the quality of information communicated 
between groups, under the four configurations of preference and information distributions 
described above.  To estimate the quality of information sent between groups, we simply average 
the noise calculations for all messages received by each group, according to the group where the 
messages originate.  For example, if the agents in group 1 made five requests to agents in group 
4, we estimate the noise associated with each of the five requests, and average these to obtain our 
final estimate of information quality sent by group 4 to group 1.  The noise estimates for the 
communication between all groups in the high cost formulation are presented in Table 7 for 
polarized candidates (positioned at 1 and 7), and Table 8 for convergent candidates (positioned at 
3 and 5). 
 
Comparing Tables 7 and 8, it is clear that candidate polarization greatly increases the 
noise communicated between groups.  When candidates are less polarized, individuals are more 
likely to communicate information that reflects their belief about the true candidate positions.  
Within each table, however, it is also clear that the information and preference distributions 
across groups have a strong effect on the accuracy of information transmitted between groups. 
 
When preferences are distributed asymmetrically (Parts A and B of both tables), noise is 
greatly reduced by within-group communication.  Under this condition, for both symmetrical and 
asymmetrical information distributions, individuals receiving information from outside of their 
own group receive much less accurate information compared to information originating within 
their own group.  Because preferences are polarized across groups, within-group communication 
produces communication between individuals of similar preferences, greatly reducing noise.  
Compared to individuals who reach outside their own group when preferences are symmetrically 
distributed (Parts C and D of both tables), asymmetrical preference distributions lead to out-
group information providers with divergent political preferences, who consequently 
communicate less accurate information. 
 
Asymmetrical information distributions (Parts A and C), on the other hand, tend to 
reduce the noise originating from all groups except the group where information is most highly 
concentrated.  For individuals in the group with highly concentrated information, information 
plays a much stronger role in determining individuals’ priors about the candidates.  
Consequently, these individuals become more likely to skew their communications, dependent 
upon their priors and the distance to the individual requesting information.  When we consider 
this result in relation to the equilibrium distributions discussed in the previous section, it 
becomes clear that asymmetrical information distributions advantage groups with high 
information concentrations in two ways: they become a dominant source of information for the 
community, but they also exert a strong influence on the quality of information received by 
different groups. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
The evidence presented in this paper supports the Downsian (1957) expectation that 
individuals will seek out politically expert informants whose political biases coincide with their 
own. In particular, when choices are available, individuals construct communication networks 
that reflect their own preferences and draw on the highest levels of expertise that are available.  
The problem arises when the range of options available to an individual are constrained – when 
individuals are located in contexts where either their own preferences are poorly represented, or 
where the level of information is relatively low, or both.  The implications of contextual 
variation for the construction of communication networks is quite important, not only for 
individuals and the information they receive, but also for levels of communication and 
polarization within and between groups, as well as for the diffusion of knowledge and 
information within larger populations. 
 
The experimental framework in this paper randomly assigned information costs and 
preferences to individuals, as well as randomly assigning these individuals to groups that varied 
in the distribution of preferences and information.  The proximate effects of individual 
assignment are that (1) subjects with lower information costs are more likely to purchase a 
higher volume of political information, and (2) subjects look for informants who are, most 
importantly, better informed and, secondarily, hold preferences similar to their own.   
 
The search for informants is made more complex by the location of individual subjects 
(as well as simulated agents) within groups.  Candidate information taken from an informant 
located within their own group is free, but information taken from an informant located in the 
opposite group is costly.  This cost imposes a constraint on the search for informants, particularly 
among those subjects who were previously assigned a high cost for the individual acquisition of 
information.   As a consequence, communication tends to be more frequent within groups than 
between groups, but the rates of in-group and out-group interaction are subject to variation due to 
variations in the distribution of information and preferences within groups. 
 
We believe that this construction is a reasonable approximation of the real world.  That 
is, given sufficient time and resources, any individual might carry on an extended search for 
associates.  Unfortunately, time and other resources are typically scarce, and hence individuals 
often carry out truncated searches within boundaries constrained as a matter of cost and 
convenience.  That is, we draw our associates from the pools of individuals who are readily 
available.  There are, of course, exceptions to this pattern – internet dating services provide an 
excellent example – but the exceptions are typically exceptional, and other observational studies 
affirm the importance of availability in the construction of communication networks (Huckfeldt 
and Sprague 1995). 
 
The constraints operating on communication make individuals and their communication 
networks vulnerable to the locally defined supply of potential informants.  In Finifter’s (1974) 
classic study of lunch time habits among autoworkers at overwhelmingly Democratic work 
places, she demonstrates the ability of Republican autoworkers to segregate themselves into 
politically congenial lunch groups.  This ability to voluntarily associate with politically 
likeminded colleagues provided a low cost mechanism to avoid the contextual constraints within 
which they were imbedded, but these sorts of options are not always available. 
 
The distributions of preferences and information levels within groups are shown to carry 
important consequences for individuals, but perhaps more importantly they generate important 
aggregate consequences as well.  First, group boundaries on communication redefine political 
expertise in terms that are relative to particular settings.  An autoworker who reads the New 
York Times may be more likely to be considered an expert by her colleagues, but a political 
science professor with the same reading habits is less to be considered an expert among her 
colleagues.  And this means that network centrality in the flow of information is affected by the 
distribution of information within the network. 
 
Second, when individual levels of information are asymmetrically distributed across 
groups, the likelihood of communication between groups is enhanced, even though the resulting 
patterns of communication may foster heterogeneous streams of information.  
 
Third, communication across groups is less likely when information is distributed 
symmetrically.  This is particularly the case when preferences are clustered within groups – that 
is, when preferences are distributed asymmetrically.  
 
Finally, the social segregation of political preferences carries unavoidable consequences 
both for the political heterogeneity of communication within networks and for the quality of 
information transmitted between groups.  Unless individuals are willing to pay a steep cost in 
their search for like-minded informants, they will be more likely to interact with individuals who 
hold politically divergent positions when they are located in groups where they are exposed to 
diverse opinions.  Alternatively, politically homogeneous groups are likely to produce politically 
homogeneous networks, unless the information level is particularly low, thereby encouraging 
individuals to look beyond the group for information.  Under these conditions, however, such 
individuals become vulnerable to receiving less reliable information from politically dominant 
groups. 
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Figure 1. Network diagrams by alternative distributions of information and preferences.  Each diagram is 
a separate session involving multiple rounds with two groups of seven subjects. 
 
 
A. First context: Asymmetric Preferences and Asymmetric Information 
 
 
  
 
 
B. Second context: Asymmetric Preferences and Symmetric Information 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 (continued). 
 
C. Third context: Symmetric Preferences and Asymmetric Information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Fourth context: Symmetric Preferences and Symmetric Information 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Key:  dark nodes=group 1; light nodes =group 2; size of nodes=amount of information purchased; width 
of edges (lines)= number of requests; arrow head=direction of request; dark lines=within group 
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squares=preferences 3‐5; up triangles=preferences 6‐7.  In color, dark is blue, and light is orange. 
 
 
Table 1. Proximate consequences of information costs. 
 
A. Individual information purchases by individual costs.  
 
                   Information Costs (ECUs) 
Information              
Purchased         0             5          25         Total  
        
     0            2.18%       8.33      21.96         12.41  
     1            4.76       12.10      37.17         20.75  
     2           13.69       38.89      40.87         32.54  
     3           16.87       18.06       0.00          9.98  
     4           62.50       22.62       0.00         24.32  
     N=            504         504        756         1,764  
 
 
B. Communication requests received from within and between groups. 
   
    Requests     in-groups   out-groups     total     
  
          0         25.7        78.5        22.4      
          1         27.0        17.9        26.1      
          2         19.8         3.1        18.0       
          3         13.3          .5        14.7      
          4         10.0          .1        10.2      
          5          3.6                     5.7       
          6           .6                     2.0       
          7-9                                 .9    
          N=       1,764       1,764       1,764 
       mean=        1.68         .26        1.94 
 
C. Prior judgments regarding candidates’ positions by information purchased, 
candidates’ true positions, and their interaction. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering on subject. 
 
                             coefficient  t-value   
 
private information purchases  -.46       10.14     
candidate true position         .35        9.65     
purchases X true position       .13       10.76     
constant                       2.41       18.08     
 
N =                                  3528          
R2, s.e. of estimate =            .38, 1.35        
 
Table 2. Information requests received from in-groups and out-groups. 
 
A. By characteristics of subjects and relevant groups. 
                                                 In-Group     Out-Group 
                                                 Requests     Requests 
                              
information purchased by subject                    .17         -.09           
                                                   (.92)        (.99)    
information purchased minus mean information        .49          .25          
      purchased by group members                  (2.88)       (3.16)         
mean information cost in group                     .003         -.03  
                                                   (.02)       (4.41)          
information purchased X mean cost in group          .01         -.001          
                                                  (1.75)        (.29)                      
absolute distance from individual preference       -.06         -.01                     
      to mean preference in group                 (1.06)        (.60)           
constant                                           1.11          .87                   
                                                  (2.10)       (3.71)  
         
N=                                                 1764          1764 
Subjects=                                           168           168 
R2=                                                 .43           .14 
SE of regression=                                  1.11           .50 
  
   
B. By treatment groups with controls for information purchases and individual 
preference relative to group's mean preference. 
 
   Mean      Individual 
group cost  subject cost 
   High           5                                1.05           .61  
                                                  (2.78)        (2.89)  
   High          25                                 .62           .16 
                                                  (5.56)        (2.90) 
   Medium         0                                 .88           .01 
                                                  (4.76)         (.16) 
   Medium         5                                 .49           .11 
                                                  (2.22)        (1.71) 
   Medium        25                                (excluded baseline) 
 
   Low            0                                -.42)         -.01 
                                                  (2.33)         (.09) 
   Low            5                                -.31          -.09  
                                                  (1.68)        (2.09) 
Information purchased                               .69           .13 
                                                 (14.24)        (7.87) 
Distance from individual preference                -.06          -.01 
   to mean group preference                       (1.09)         (.86) 
Constant                                            .13          -.03 
                                                  (1.04)         (.73) 
  
N =                                                1764          1764 
Subjects=                                           168           168 
R2=                                                 .43           .15 
SE of estimate=                                    1.11           .50 
 
Table 3. Factors affecting the subject’s selection of information. 
 
                                                    
A. Whether subject chooses a potential informant.  Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering on subject. 
  
                                               Coefficient    t-value      
  
Potential informant’s information purchase          .62      15.40     
    
Distance between ideal points of                   -.17       4.37  
      subject and potential informant    
Whether potential informant belongs to same        1.88       5.77     
      goup as subject (dummy coded) 
Whether subject pays medium information cost        .08        .26 
      (dummy coded) 
Medium information cost X same group               -.25        .59   
 
Whether subject pays high information cost        -1.03       3.28 
      (dummy coded 
High information cost X same group                 1.39       3.62   
 
Constant                                          -4.07      13.50  
     
N=                                                      22932  
Subjects=                                                168 
χ2,df,p    =                                          545,7,.00 
  
 
 
 
 
B. Predicted probabilities of selection based on estimates in Part A. 
 
 
 Subject      Distance between                 potential informant 
Information   subject/informant    same        information purchase 
   Cost         ideal points       group?      Low (0)      High (4) 
  
   low/medium        0             no           .02          .17 
   low/medium        0             yes          .10          .57 
 
   low/medium        6             no           .01          .07 
   low/medium        6             yes          .04          .33 
    
   high              0             no           .01          .07 
   high              0             yes          .14          .66 
 
   high              6             no           .002         .03 
   high              6             yes          .05          .41 
 
 
  
 
Table 4A. Informant messages by initial estimates and distance between dyad 
members.  O.L.S. model with standard errors are adjusted for clustering on 
subject. 
 
 
                                Coefficient   T-value     
Initial Estimate                   .82        30.02 
Distance Between Dyad Members      .32         5.15 
Estimate * Distance               -.07         4.83 
Constant                           .66         5.83   
 
N                                       5,650 
R2,  M.S.E.                          .43, 1.36 
 
 
 
 
Table 4B. Predicted informant messages based on estimates in Table 4A. 
 
 
                        Informant’s Initial Estimate 
                           of Candidate’s Position 
                    1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
              0|  1.48   2.30   3.13   3.95   4.77   5.59   6.41 
              1|  1.73   2.47   3.22   3.97   4.72   5.46   6.21 
Distance      2|  1.97   2.64   3.32   3.99   4.66   5.33   6.01 
Between       3|  2.21   2.81   3.41   4.01   4.61   5.21   5.80 
Dyad Members  4|  2.46   2.98   3.51   4.03   4.55   5.08   5.60 
              5|  2.70   3.15   3.60   4.05   4.50   4.95   5.40 
              6|  2.94   3.32   3.69   4.07   4.44   4.82   5.19 
 
Table 5.  Agent-based simulations of cross-group communication for low and 
medium cost subjects: group transition rates with implied equilibria. 
 
 
A. distributions:  asymmetrical preferences; asymmetrical information 
                       
                                 Source of Information 
                       group 1     group 2     group 3    group 4    Σ 
 
            group 1     .815        .044        .043       .098    1.00 
source of   group2      .001        .847        .056       .097    1.00 
request     group3      .000        .018        .864       .118    1.00 
            group4      .000        .007        .017       .976    1.00 
 
           equilibrium  .00         .05         .13        .83 
 
 
B. distributions:  asymmetrical preferences; symmetrical information 
  
                                 Source of Information 
                       group 1     group 2     group 3    group 4    Σ 
 
            group1      .910        .046       .028       .016     1.00 
source of   group2      .043        .886       .046       .026     1.00 
request     group3      .030        .039       .886       .044     1.00 
            group4      .020        .023       .044       .913     1.00 
 
           equilibrium  .25         .24        .25        .25  
 
 
C. distributions:  symmetrical preferences; asymmetrical information             
 
                                 Source of Information 
                       group 1     group 2     group 3    group 4    Σ 
 
            group1      .621        .041        .090       .248    1.00 
source of   group2      .003        .775        .058       .164    1.00 
request     group3      .002        .027        .839       .132    1.00 
            group4      .002        .014        .022       .962    1.00 
 
           equilibrium    .01         .07         .14        .79   
 
 
D. distributions:  symmetrical preferences; symmetrical information   
                           
                                 Source of Information 
                       group 1     group 2     group 3    group 4    Σ 
 
            group1      .838        .052        .059       .051    1.00 
source of   group2      .052        .850        .051       .047    1.00 
request     group3      .055        .053        .826       .067    1.00 
            group4      .053        .061        .047       .839    1.00 
 
           equilibrium  .25         .28         .24        .26   
Table 6.  Agent-based simulations of cross-group communication for all 
subjects: group transition rates with implied equilibria. 
 
 
A. distributions:  asymmetrical preferences; asymmetrical information 
                       
                                 Source of Information 
                       group 1     group 2     group 3    group 4    Σ 
 
            group 1     .951        .011        .011       .027    1.00 
source of   group2      .000        .911        .024       .065    1.00 
request     group3      .000        .014        .898       .088    1.00 
            group4      .000        .005        .024       .971    1.00 
 
           equilibrium  .00         .07         .19        .74 
 
 
B. distributions:  asymmetrical preferences; symmetrical information 
  
                                 Source of Information 
                       group 1     group 2     group 3    group 4    Σ 
 
            group1      .939        .029       .017       .014     1.00 
source of   group2      .033        .913       .037       .017     1.00 
request     group3      .023        .033       .918       .026     1.00 
            group4      .007        .020       .032       .941     1.00 
 
           equilibrium  .25         .23        .25        .24  
 
 
C. distributions:  symmetrical preferences; asymmetrical information             
 
                                 Source of Information 
                       group 1     group 2     group 3    group 4    Σ 
 
            group1      .853        .007        .025       .114    1.00 
source of   group2      .000        .887        .027       .086    1.00 
request     group3      .001        .011        .894       .094    1.00 
            group4      .002        .014        .029       .955    1.00 
 
           equilibrium    .01         .10         .21        .67   
 
 
D. distributions:  symmetrical preferences; symmetrical information   
                           
                                 Source of Information 
                       group 1     group 2     group 3    group 4    Σ 
 
            group1      .888        .036        .031       .045    1.00 
source of   group2      .038        .888        .041       .032    1.00 
request     group3      .024        .037        .904       .034    1.00 
            group4      .032        .037        .032       .900    1.00 
 
           equilibrium  .21         .24         .26        .26   
  
 
 
Table 7.  Agent-based simulations of noise in cross-group communication for 
high cost subjects: candidates positioned at 1 and 7. 
 
 
A. distributions:  asymmetrical preferences; asymmetrical information 
                       
                                 Source of Information 
                       group 1     group 2     group 3    group 4 
 
            group 1     .31         .55         .98        1.71   
source of   group 2      -          .42         .68        1.27   
request     group 3      -          .65         .49         .88  
            group 4      -          .82         .69         .61    
 
 
B. distributions:  asymmetrical preferences; symmetrical information 
  
                                 Source of Information 
                       group 1     group 2     group 3    group 4 
 
            group 1     .50         .79        1.22        1.68   
source of   group 2     .81         .51         .80        1.21   
request     group 3    1.17         .77         .51         .78  
            group 4    1.78        1.19         .81         .50    
 
 
C. distributions:  symmetrical preferences; asymmetrical information             
 
                                 Source of Information 
                       group 1     group 2     group 3    group 4 
 
            group 1     .52         .52         .58         .87   
source of   group 2      -          .69         .70         .86   
request     group 3     0.26        .52         .81         .89  
            group 4     0.26        .54         .64        1.05    
 
 
D. distributions:  symmetrical preferences; symmetrical information   
                           
                                 Source of Information 
                       group 1     group 2     group 3    group 4 
 
            group 1     .85         .84         .82         .84   
source of   group 2     .81         .86         .92         .78 
request     group 3     .76         .80         .87         .77  
            group 4     .72         .88         .91         .87    
 
 
 
 
Table 8.  Agent-based simulations of noise in cross-group communication for 
high cost subjects: candidates positioned at 3 and 5. 
 
 
A. distributions:  asymmetrical preferences; asymmetrical information 
                       
                                 Source of Information 
                       group 1     group 2     group 3    group 4 
 
            group 1     .10         .18         .33         .57   
source of   group 2      -          .14         .23         .42   
request     group 3      -          .22         .16         .29  
            group 4      -          .27         .23         .20    
 
 
B. distributions:  asymmetrical preferences; symmetrical information 
  
                                 Source of Information 
                       group 1     group 2     group 3    group 4 
 
            group 1     .17         .26         .41         .56   
source of   group 2     .27         .17         .27         .20   
request     group 3     .39         .26         .17         .26  
            group 4     .59         .40         .27         .17    
 
 
C. distributions:  symmetrical preferences; asymmetrical information             
 
                                 Source of Information 
                       group 1     group 2     group 3    group 4 
 
            group 1     .17         .17         .19         .29   
source of   group 2      -          .23         .23         .29   
request     group 3     0.09        .17         .27         .30  
            group 4     0.09        .18         .21         .35    
 
 
D. distributions:  symmetrical preferences; symmetrical information   
                           
                                 Source of Information 
                       group 1     group 2     group 3    group 4 
 
            group 1     .28         .28         .27         .28   
source of   group 2     .27         .29         .31         .26 
request     group 3     .25         .27         .29         .26  
            group 4     .24         .29         .30         .29    
 
  
Appendix 
 
Table A1 shows the asymmetric and symmetric distributions both for agent preferences and for 
agent information levels.  Part A of Table 5 and 6 employs asymmetrical preference distributions 
and asymmetrical information distributions.  Part B employs asymmetrical preference 
distributions and symmetrical information distributions.  Part C employs symmetrical preference 
distributions and asymmetrical information distributions.  Part D employs  symmetrical 
preference distributions and symmetrical information distributions.  
 
Table A1.  Symmetrical and asymmetrical preference and information 
distributions across groups. 
 
A. symmetrical preference distributions across groups 
 
Group 1                  Group 2 
  0 1 2 | 0 1 2 
  3 4 5 | 3 4 5 
  6 7 8 | 6 7 8  
_________________________________________________ 
Group 3                  Group 4 
  0 1 2 | 0 1 2 
  3 4 5 | 3 4 6 
  6 7 8 | 6 7 8 
 
B. asymmetrical preference distributions across groups 
 
  0 0 0 | 2 2 2 
  0 1 1 | 3 3 3 
  1 1 2 | 3 4 4  
_________________________________________________ 
 
  4 4 5 | 6 7 7 
  5  5 5 | 7 7 8 
  6 6 6 | 8 8 8 
 
 
 
C. symmetrical information distributions across groups, randomly  
 assigned within groups 
 
 
  0 1 1 | 0 1 1 
  2 2 2 | 2 2 2 
  3 4 4 | 3 4 4  
__________________________________________________ 
  0 1 1 | 0 1 1 
  2 2 2 | 2 2 2 
  3 4 4 | 3 4 4 
 
D. asymmetrical information distributions across groups, randomly  
 assigned within groups 
 
 
  0 0 0 | 1 1 1 
  0 1 1 | 2 2 2 
  1 1 1 | 2 2 2  
_________________________________________________ 
 
  2 2 2 | 3 4 4 
  2  2 2 | 4 4 4 
  3 3 3 | 4 4 4 
 
 
